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Abstract—This paper proposes two mathematical structures for
considering the market power effect of transmission capacity in
transmission augmentation assessment. These mathematical struc-
tures use the concepts of monopoly rent and quantity withheld in
economics for market power modeling in the assessment process of
transmission augmentation. The simultaneous-move and sequen-
tial-move games in applied mathematics are used to model the in-
teractions of the transmission network service provider, generating
companies, and the market management company in the proposed
mathematical structures. The solution concept of Nash equilibria
is reformulated as an optimization problem, and the multiple Nash
equilibria is tackled through an introduced concept termed worst
Nash equilibrium. A numerical solution is developed to solve the
proposed mathematical structures. The numerical solution is an
island parallel genetic algorithm nested in a standard genetic algo-
rithm. The six-bus Garver’s example system and the IEEE 14-bus
test system are modified and studied. The results prove the strong
mechanism of the developed structures for modeling the market
power effect of transmission capacity in the assessment of trans-
mission augmentation.
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Bidding quantity of GenCos.
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Lagrange multiplier vector associated with the
production of generating units.
Lagrange multiplier vector associated with
retailers consumption.
Lagrange multiplier vector associated with the
energy balance equation under competitive
conditions.
Lagrange multiplier vector associated with
transmission lines inequity (thermal capacity
limit) under competitive conditions.
Lagrange multiplier vector associated with the
production of generating units under competitive
conditions.
Lagrange multiplier vector associated with
retailers consumption under competitive
conditions.
Node angle vector under competitive conditions.
Dispatched capacity of GenCos under competitive
conditions.
Dispatched demand of retailers under competitive
conditions.
Vector variable representing TNSP’s decision
variables.
Vector variable representing GenCo i decision
variables.
Vector variable representing decision variables of
all GenCos except GenCo i.
Vector variable representing decision variables of
MMC.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ARKET POWER of a producer is the ability to prof-itably maintain market prices above competitive levels
for a significant period of time [1]. In economics, for a firm to
have market power, the following two elements must be present.
1) First, the firm must have the ability to influence the market
price by varying its own output.
2) Second, in doing so, the firm must be able to earn excess
returns in the medium or long term [2].
A firm that has no influence over the market price is said to
be a price taker and not deemed to have market power.
The exercise of market power in electricity market involves
reducing output in order to raise the market price, and thereby
earn even higher overall profit on the remaining output. This has
the following effects.
1) The price-duration curve is higher than in the absence of
the market power.
2) Themarket price reaches the price capmore frequently and
load shedding occur more frequently than in the absence of
market power.
Joskow and Schmalensee [3] showed numerically that trans-
mission expansion reduces generators’ market power. Wolfram
[4] has examined empirically the bidding behavior of genera-
tors in England and Wales, including the impact of transmis-
sion constraints. Accordingly, he [4] reports that in England and
Wales generators protected by transmission constraints bid sig-
nificantly higher than those without this status.
There have been various occasions in the Australian National
Electricity Market (NEM) when a generator exercised market
power because of constrained interconnectors. On February 4,
2003, an unplanned outage on the interconnector between the
states of Victoria and South Australia reduced its capacity sub-
stantially. Consequently, a large generator in the SouthAustralia
region rebid 112MWof its capacity to prices greater than $9000
[2].
Using a simplified version of the power network in Cali-
fornia [5] has quantified the impact of local market power and
transmission capacity. Bushnell [6] and Joskow and Tirole [7]
show that generators benefit from a reduction in transmission
capacity. Also, using a stylized version of the North America
transmission system [8] highlights the effect of transmission ca-
pacity on encouraging competition among generating compa-
nies (GenCos).
Transmission capacity has been proved as an effective policy
to reduce market power [9]–[11]. Leautier [11] suggests that
policy maker can and should use transmission capacity for re-
ducing market power in electricity markets.
In [12], no technical literature is cited on modeling of the
market power in the mechanism of transmission expansion
planning.
Leautier [10] sets up a framework for transmission plan-
ning based on the marginal value of transmission capacity.
Despite of having a closed-form formulation, the mechanism
cannot model the market power effect of transmission capacity.
Shrestha and Fonseka [13] employ the same mathematical
structure of [10], but used the congestion cost and conges-
tion revenue as the driving signals for the need of network
expansion. The proper level of congestion for a transmission
network and the lack of modeling of market power effect of
additional transmission capacity are two main shortcomings of
the proposed framework. Lu et al. [14] suggest two heuristic
procedures for transmission augmentation. The authors use
unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium for the set of producers’
bids, while the bids from the demand side are assumed as
known from the analysis of the existing market data. Clearly,
unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium cannot reflect the reality
of the electricity market.
The TEAM methodology introduced by the California Inde-
pendent System Operator (ISO) [15] can be acknowledged as
a good model for economics-based transmission augmentation.
However, it has two drawbacks. First, the strategic bidding of
GenCos has been estimated through a tailor-made and empir-
ical methodology that limits its application. Second, the whole
framework does not have an integrated mathematical structure.
To model the market power effect of transmission capacity
in the process of transmission augmentation, this paper pro-
poses two closed-form mathematical structures. The mathemat-
ical structures are developed based on the concepts of quan-
tity withheld and monopoly rent (MR) in economics. A metric
termed L-shape area is developed and employed to model the
quantity withheld concept. A numerical solution is developed
to solve the mathematical structures. Section II deals with the
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Fig. 1. Marginal cost curve and the biding strategy of a GenCo.
derivation of the mathematical structures. The developed nu-
merical solution is detailed in Section III. Two case studies, the
Garver’s example system and the IEEE 14-bus example system,
are employed and modified carefully to suit the needs of the
calculations. The experimental results and discussions are col-
lected in Section IV. Concluding remarks in SectionVwill close
this paper.
II. BUILDING OF THE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE
FOR TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AUGMENTATION
Mathematical structures of the transmission augmentation
considering the market power effect of transmission capacity
are developed in three stages. In the first stage, we use the con-
cepts of the simultaneous-move game and the Nash solution to
model the electricity market operation. To derive a closed-form
mathematical structure, the Nash equilibrium is reformulated
as an optimization problem. In the second stage, the worst case
Nash equilibrium is mathematically modeled based on two
concepts of the MR and a developed metric termed the L-shape
area. These two metrics are developed to model the effect of
transmission capacity in reducing market power. In the third
stage, the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium concept is employed
to derive the final mathematical structures. The developed
structures can capture the effect of transmission capacity in
reducing market power in their mechanisms of augmentation.
We assume retailers to be competitive, and consequently, they
do not behave strategically. Also, the study is for the worst-case
scenario of the power system.
A. Reformulation of the Nash Equilibrium Concept as the
Zeros of M Function for Simulating of the Electricity Market
Each GenCo offers a price-quantity pair to the
market management company (MMC) to participate in the
market. The marginal cost of a GenCo and its bidding strategy
are shown in Fig. 1.
The and are the minimum and maximum
limits on price offer of a GenCo. These limits are usually set by
the electricity market regulator. The competition on price, the
competition on quantity, and the competition on both price and
quantity are economic structures established to model GenCos
in an electricity market. This paper uses the price-quantity game
to model GenCos.
Given the bidding strategies of other GenCo and TNSP’s
planning schedule revealed, each GenCo can find its op-
timal strategy using the bilevel programming problem in the
following:
(1)
where is the nodal admittance matrix of the transmission
system. is a matrix, with as the total number
of buses in the system, is the vector of bus angles, and
are the generation level of committed generators and the served
demand of retailers, is the MW flow between nodes i and j,
and is the maximum thermal capacity for the branch i-j.
Also, is the susceptance of the branch i-j, is the existing
number of circuits, and is the transmission network service
provider (TNSP) decision variable on the number of new cir-
cuits. The variables and are the Lagrange multipliers of the
associated constraints. The vector is the price of energy at dif-
ferent network connection points.
Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, (1)
can be generalized as
(2)
where is the profit of GenCo , is the TNSP decision
vector, is the action vector of the GenCO,
and , with as the total
number of GenCos. The vector and vector
is constrained by the set of , which is the set defined by the
constraints of the inner optimization problem in (1). The ele-
ments of vector are the dispatched generation capacity, the
dispatched demand, the bus angle, and the Lagrange multipliers
as defined in (1).
Since all GenCos are of equal status, they must reveal their
strategies simultaneously. Hence, for all GenCos, a popular so-
lution concept is the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as the
problem of finding the zeros of a function , which is defined
in (3).
Definition 1: Let Y be a nonempty set that defines the strategy
space of all GenCos participating in the electricity market. The
function is defined as follows:
(3)
The following theorem can be derived consequently.
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Theorem 1: The function is real and non-
negative on . Also, Nash equilibria are the zeros of .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Having (3) as the alternative formulation of Nash equilibria,
the mathematical framework of the competition among GenCos
can be built as
(4)
If an array satisfies
, then must be a solution
of (4), and consequently, a Nash equilibrium of the game. The
set of all optimal solutions of (3) is the Nash equilibria of the
price-quantity game among GenCos. If (3) does not have any
optimal solution, there is no Nash equilibrium of GenCos in
the given bilevel programming problem.
The set of Nash equilibria of the price-quantity game can be
found by solving the optimization problem formulated in (4).
An average method to deal with many Nash equilibria of the
quantity game among GenCos was used in [16]. This method-
ology calculates the situation of the market under each Nash
equilibrium. Then after, the method takes an average for each
of variables of interest in the process of transmission augmen-
tation. The problem with this method is that, in some cases,
the average of interested variable approaches zero and cannot
provide any valuable information to the process of transmission
augmentation.
This paper uses the worst Nash equilibrium in terms of MR
or a developed metric termed L-shape area metric ( ) for sim-
ulating the electricity market. The MR and the are used for
measuring market power.
The mathematical formulations of the worst Nash equilib-
rium in terms of MR and the are formulated as follows:
(5)
(6)
By doing this, the worst equilibrium of the market is used in
transmission augmentation as a signal that is always available.
B. Measuring Market Power—Application of the Quantity
Withheld and MR Concepts
The introduction of competitive markets aims to reduce
prices, improve the quality of services, and on a long-term basis
make the market more efficient [17]. Providing an environment
for perfect competition between generators on one side of
market and between retailers on the other side is the necessary
condition in achieving the aforementioned targets.
The conditions required for perfect competition are [18]:
1) a large number of generators producing the same product;
2) each generator attempts to maximize its payoff;
3) each generator is a price taker;
4) generators have exact knowledge of all parameters of sig-
nificance to their decisions; and
5) transmission is costless.
The first condition aims to prevent the formation of market
concentration in terms of Herfindahl-Hirshman index and piv-
otal generators in terms of residual supply index [19]. Having
rational generators is the immediate consequence of second con-
dition [20]. It can be mathematically shown that a rational gen-
erator requires bidding its marginal cost, assuming that the gen-
erator is a price taker, to maximize its profit [21]. Condition
4) addresses that the generators must have perfect information.
Finally, the last condition addresses bottlenecks in the high-
voltage transmission systems. Bottlenecks are one of the major
issues in market separation. Arguably, none of these conditions
ever exists in a real electricity market. Accordingly, the real
electricity market has deviation from the competitive electricity
market.
GenCos can exercise market power in two ways, namely, fi-
nancial withholding and physical withholding. Financial with-
holding means bidding excessively above the marginal cost of
production and driving up the price. Physical withholding is
when a GenCo withholds some of its available capacity from
the market, thus reducing effective supply and driving up the
price it receives for the rest of its portfolio [19].
The MR is economically defined as the extra return that
GenCos receive from the electricity market as a result of
exercising market power [22].
Themarket power can bemeasured based on its consequences
on the electricity market. Section II-B1 measures market power
through a developed metric termed L-shape area. The L-shape
area is designed to model two forms of financial withholding
and physical withholding in a single metric. Section II-B2 mea-
sures the market power based on the MR consequence of the
market power.
1) Design of the for Measuring Market Power—Appli-
cation of the Quantity Withheld Concept: The is designed
based on measuring the deviation of the electricity market
equilibrium from the competitive equilibrium of the electricity
market.
Definition of : Let and be the nonempty vectors in
representing nodal prices (in $/MWh), and let
and be the aggregated offered capacity of GenCos (in
MWh) in the following two scenarios:
1) competitive electricity market with relaxed transmission
constraints; and
2) actual electricity market.
If is the Euclidean norm of the vector as in
(7)
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Fig. 2. L-shape area metric.
then (in $/h) is
(8)
where is depicted in Fig. 2.
The variable is the price distortion of the electricity
market, , and is the quantity with-
held, .
Based on the criterion and having the profitability as-
sumed, the following theorem can be developed.
Theorem 2: Let point c shown in Fig. 2 represent the com-
petitive equilibrium of the electricity market. Also, let point e
shown in Fig. 2 represent the actual equilibrium of the electricity
market. The necessary and sufficient condition for perfect com-
petition in the electricity market is that
(9)
Proof: See Appendix B.
In this paper, we approximate the competitive equilibrium
of the electricity market with the one with relaxed transmis-
sion constraints. This reduces the complexity of the associated
mathematical structure for modeling market power in the intro-
duced mechanism of the transmission augmentation. Although
this calculation is in line with [23]–[25], but further research can
be carried out to remove this assumption. One possible approach
to proceed is to find the metric for each node of the system.
2) MR Metric for Measuring Market Power: Consumers
are likely to be harmed by the strategic behaviors of GenCos.
It is likely that all consumers will face higher prices if some
GenCos bid strategically. Similarly, some GenCos will have
higher profits under strategic bidding than they would if all
GenCos bid their marginal cost curve.
MR is the consequence of exercising market power by
GenCos. It is defined as the excess profit that GenCos capture
under strategic bidding behaviors.
Mathematically, the MR can be calculated as
(10)
where is the profit of the GenCo in the electricity market
and is the profit of the same GenCo in the competitive elec-
tricity market.
C. Mathematical Structure of the TNSP
Augmentation Mechanism
The proposed mathematical structures for transmission
system augmentation based on the developed metrics of quan-
tity withheld or MR, and also the introduced function
are presented in (11) and (12), respectively. Both mathematical
structures can reduce market power in the electricity market
through their assessment mechanisms of transmission system
augmentation.
In the structures (11) and (12), is the transmission invest-
ment cost between nodes i and j, is an integer number, which
represents the new circuits in the corridor i-j with a maximum
number of , is the competitive dispatch of the GenCo i,
and is the competitive dispatch of retailer i. The is the
monopoly rent as introduced previously
(11)
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(12)
The minimization problem, , is the security-
constraint economic dispatch under competitive equilibrium of
the electricity market. Dispatch results of the competitive equi-
librium of the electricity market, denoted by letter “c” as the su-
perscript in (12), are used for calculating the GenCos’ profit in
the competitive equilibrium of the electricity market. Also, the
effect of transmission capacity on the efficiency of the electricity
market is obtained through the minimization
problem. The objective of this minimization problem is the total
cost to the society at the competitive equilibrium of the elec-
tricity market and termed competitive social cost. Accordingly,
the TNSP objective function in (12), , has three components:
the transmission investment cost, the competitive social cost,
and the MR. The competitive social cost is used to measure
the impact of transmission capacity on the efficiency of the dis-
patch and the MR as a metric of the market power exercised by
GenCos.
Comparing the mathematical structure introduced in (11)
with the one introduced in (12) can clearly show that intro-
ducing the metric has reduced the mathematical structure
from a three-level structure to a two-level structure.
The transmission planning schedule found based on the struc-
ture (11) or (12) is developed for the highest forecast demand in
the horizon year of planning. The coefficient is the duration
of this load scenario in hours.
In developing of the mathematical structures (11) and (12),
a single scenario of the electricity market is considered. The
most likely scenario of the electricity market for the sake of this
paper study can be found using the “importance sampling tech-
nique” reported in [15]. This helps to make the contributions of
the paper clear without making it cloudy with the uncertainties
involved in the decision-making process. However, the exten-
sion of the proposed structures to include the uncertainties can
be addressed in future research works.
III. DESIGNED NUMERICAL SOLUTION
Generally, optimization algorithms can be categorized in
two classes: deterministic and stochastic algorithms [26], [27].
State-space search, branch and bound, and algebraic geometry
are samples of the deterministic approaches. The Monte Carlo
algorithm, evolutionary computation, and swarm intelligence
are classified under the stochastic algorithms. Because of the
complexity of the developed structures in (10) and (11), which
stems from the nested optimization and the high dimensionality
of the search space, deterministic approaches cannot lead to
promising results. To reduce the complexity of the developed
structures and make it more suitable for stochastic optimization
approaches, the price-quantity pairs offered by GenCos are
approximated by discrete variables. Then after, a stochastic
optimization algorithm is designed to find a near-optimum
solution of the developed structures.
The developed optimization algorithm is a standard genetic
algorithm (GA) nested with an island parallel genetic algorithm
(IPGA). The GA deals with the TNSP decision variables, and
the IPGA deals with the decision variables of the electricity
market operation. The steps of the developed numerical solu-
tions are as follows.
Step 1) Input power system and electricity market data, and
set the generation number to 1.
Step 2) Initialize the TNSP parent population randomly.
Step 3) Go to IPGAmodule and find the worst or MR as-
sociated with each of transmission planning sched-
ules in the parent population.
Step 4) Increase the generation number by 1.
Step 5) Produce the offspring population through the selec-
tion, crossover, and mutation operators of GA from
the parent population.
Step 6) Go to IPGAmodule and find the worst or MR as-
sociated with each of transmission planning sched-
ules in the offspring population.
Step 7) Rank transmission planning schedules in the TNSP
population using the following Pareto ranking tech-
nique [28].
Step 7.1) Set
Step 7.2) Identify nondominated solutions in the
TNSP population and assign them to rank i.
Step 7.3) Set .
Step 7.4) Exclude the rank i solutions from the
TNSP population.
Step 7.5) If all of the TNSP solutions are ranked
go to step 7.6 else go to step 7.2.
Step 7.6) End.
1) Update the parent population by the best TNSP’s designs.
2) If the generation number is greater than maximum number
of generations, then go to step 10; else go to step 4.
3) Display the TNSP’s designs of the last generation with
rank one as the best-found transmission planning schedule.
An IPGA is embedded in the GA for solving the multimodal
optimization problem introduced by the function. The tech-
niques developed for solving problems of this type falls into
three broad categories [29].
1) Iterative methods [30], [31]:
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Fig. 3. Typical communication topology for hybrid bilevel GA/IPGA.
Iterative methods address the problem of locating mul-
tiple optimal of a multimodal function by repeatedly ap-
plying the same optimization algorithm. To prevent re-
peated convergence to the same solution, iterative methods
use various techniques to prohibit the underlying optimiza-
tion method from exploring the already explored areas.
2) Fitness sharing [32], [33]:
The idea of sharing comes from an analogy with nature. In
natural ecosystems, there are many different ways in which
species may survive and form different roles. Each role is
an ecological niche. The analogy in function optimization
is that the location of each optimum represents a niche, and
by suitably sharing the fitness associated with each niche,
we can encourage the formation of stable subpopulations
at each optimum.
3) Parallel islands [34]:
This method tries to produce multiple solutions to a mul-
timodal optimization problem by forming populations that
evolve in parallel. Themethod of parallel islands uses some
communication topology to allow good characteristics of
individuals to be spread.
Unlike the iterative methods and fitness sharing methods, the
initial implementation of the parallel islands method has shown
very promising results in solving the multimodal optimization
problem introduced by the function. Hence, the IPGA has
been designed based on the concept of the communicative par-
allel islands.
The island model will consider N islands
each of them with S chromosomes. They evolve separately with
a specific communication topology. The island method causes
diversification among individuals and removes the pressure of
the already found optima from other individuals.
Given N islands, the next decision is the subpopulation in-
terconnection. This generally referred to as the communication
topology in which the islands accept or send migrants from or to
other islands. The N islands are considered to
be the vertices of a graph with each edge specifying a communi-
cation link between the incident vertices. In our developed nu-
merical solution, the communication topology is considered to
be static. Fig. 3 shows some typical communication topologies.
Given the ability of two islands to communicate, the magni-
tude and frequency of the communication must be determined.
The migration pattern is important to the overall evolutionary
process. The connectivity of the communication topology, the
magnitude of the communication, and the frequency of the com-
munication are the very important factors of the migration op-
erator. These parameters determine the amount of isolation and
interaction among the subpopulations.
Fig. 4. One iteration of IPGA.
After employing the migration operator, the islands will
evolve for a specific number of times through the crossover
and mutation operators of the GAs. At this stage, the set of
are formed. Each of the evolved islands,
, will be checked for any zero of the func-
tion. If any island has converged to zero(s) of the function,
the zeros will be compared to an archive list and the new ones
will be added to the archive.
Fig. 4 shows an iteration of the IPGA module based on the
migration operator.
The IPGA module starts with the initialization of the islands
1 to N. Then these islands communicate with each other using
the communication topology and the migration pattern. This
is done through the migration operator. At this stage, each is-
land evolves in isolation employing the standard GA to get the
evolved islands to . The evolved island will be checked
and new zeros of the function will be archived, the ACH box
shown in Fig. 4.
The IPGA terminates the iterations based on the one of the
following stop criteria:
1) total number of iterations is greater than the maximum
number of iterations; or
2) the algorithm has not found any new zero of the function
for the last few iterations.
The developed IPGA can effectively locate the set of Nash
equilibria of the electricity market. Then after, the worst Nash
equilibrium can be found by calculating the MR metric or the
under different equilibriums of the electricity market using
linear programming.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Two example systems are selected and analyzed. The concept
of the designed structures is explained by a thorough economic
study of the modified Garver’s example system. The IEEE
14-bus example system is modified and employed to show the
whole process of transmission system augmentation including
the mechanism and the developed numerical solution. Both
example systems are designed carefully to suit the needs of the
economic studies. Throughout the economic study, we compare
the optimal policies of the TNSP obtained by the derived
mathematical structures in (11) and (12) with each other. Also,
the optimal policy of the TNSP without considering market
power is compared with the mathematical structures in (11) and
(12). The software code is written in Fortran language using the
International Mathematical and Statistical Library (IMSL). The
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TRANSMISSION NETWORK AUGMENTATION DATA
developed code is solved on a double-core, 3.0-GHz, Pentium-4
PC.
A. Modified Garver’s Example System
For conceptual evaluation of the developed structures, a mod-
ified Garver’s six-bus example system has been tested.
The Garver’s example system has been modified to a net-
work with six buses and eight transmission lines. The data of
the system are presented in Tables I–IV.
The single line diagram of the example system is shown in
Fig. 5.
Each GenCo has ten strategies to participate in the energy
market. These strategies are built up by fixing the price at the
Fig. 5. Modified Garver’s example system.
marginal cost and varying the quantity from 10% of generation
capacity to total capacity in steps of 10%.
Section IV-B accommodates an economic study on market
power under the scenario in which the transmission system is
augmented by the and also the MR metric.
B. Economic Study on Market Power Under the Scenarios in
Which the Transmission System is Augmented by the and
the MR Metric
The approximate competitive equilibrium of the electricity
market is located at (1280 MW, 20 $/MWh). The equilibrium of
the electricity market in the status quo transmission system is at
(432 MW, 15 067 $/MWh). The GenCos reduce their capacity
by 848 MW and this raises the market price from 20 $/MWh
to 15 067 $/MWh. This is equivalent to .
The high order of shows the high sensitivity of the market
price to the generators capacity. This can be expected for the
current case study as a result of limited number of GenCos.
Fig. 6 shows different planning schedules of the TNSP ranked
based on the cost of transmission planning schedule and the
metric.
Since is the deviation from the approximate competitive
equilibrium, the lower rank presents the better situation of the
electricity market in terms of market power. The pareto optimal
set of the TNSP solutions, the pareto front, and the strength
of each solution are shown in Fig. 6. The strength of pareto
optimal solutions or the TNSP revenue cap can be employed
for ranking the pareto optimal set of the TNSP solutions.
This section uses $1 500 000 as the TNSP revenue cap for its
economic study. Given this, the TNSP solution with strength of
221/257 will be selected. This TNSP solution dominates 221
solutions of the total 257 solutions of the TNSP. The vector
shows the number of circuits in
each corridor of Table IV. Line number in Table IV is the
element number of the vector . Considering the selected
optimum transmission planning schedule for the TNSP, the
bid-based security-constrained economic dispatch results for
the equilibrium of the electricity market in status quo trans-
mission system and in augmented transmission system are
collected in Tables V–VIII.
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Fig. 6. Pareto front of the TNSP transmission planning schedules based on the
proposed metric and the transmission investment cost.
TABLE V
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS IN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE ELECTRICITY
MARKET IN STATUS QUO TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
TABLE VI
POWER FLOWS OF THE TRANSMISSION LINES IN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE
ELECTRICITY MARKET IN STATUS QUO TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
Table IX compares the market power metrics of financial
withholding, physical withholding, and the proposed metric
in two scenarios of the status quo transmission system and the
augmented transmission system. The overall profit of GenCos
is calculated in the last row of Table IX.
As in Table IX, the transmission planning schedule
has decreased the market power in terms of financial with-
holding by 46%. This is measured by price distortion metric,
. Similarly, quantity withheld measured by
has reduced by 6%, which is an improve-
ment in overall physical withholding.
The decrease of financial and physical withholding of the
electricity market and a reduction of 19% in overall profit of
GenCos can be understood as the market power reduction as the
TABLE VII
ECONOMIC DISPATCH RESULTS IN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE ELECTRICITY
MARKET IN AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
TABLE VIII
POWER FLOWS OF THE TRANSMISSION LINES IN THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE
ELECTRICITY MARKET IN AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
TABLE IX
FINANCIAL WITHHOLDING, PHYSICAL WITHHOLDING, AND THE THREE
METRICS OF MARKET POWER IN TWO SCENARIOS OF THE STATUS
QUO AND AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
consequence of the TNSP planning schedule. The overall reduc-
tion in market power is about 46%, calculated based on the
metric.
While the transmission planning schedule
reduces the market power of the elec-
tricity market, the traditional mechanism of augmentation [10]
does not approve any transmission planning schedule for the
TNSP.
Fig. 7 shows offer curves of the GenCos in two scenarios
of status quo and augmented transmission systems. Note that
as a result of the augmentation, GenCo2 offers more of its ca-
pacity, which has an impact on GenCo 1 withholding some of
its capacity.
Table X shows the GenCos’ profits in two scenarios of status
quo and augmented transmission system.
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Fig. 7. Marginal cost curve (with bold lines) and the strategy curves of GenCos
(with dashed lines) before and after transmission augmentation strategy by the
proposed model.
TABLE X
GENCOS’ PROFITS IN TWO SCENARIOS OF STATUS QUO
AND AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
If we solve the mathematical structure in (11) using the de-
veloped numerical solution in Section III, the pareto front of the
TNSP transmission planning schedules would result in a 3-D
figure as shown in Fig. 8.
The pareto front has 28 different planning schedules of the
TNSP. These planning schedules are dominant alternative so-
lutions of the TNSP for economics-based augmentation of the
transmission system. Using $1 500 000 as the TNSP revenue
cap and ranking the pareto front solutions result in the vector
as the TNSP solution.
The TNSP solution of selected
based on the MR metric is the same as the one that was selected
based on the developed metric. However, comparing Figs. 6
and 8 clearly shows two following advantages of the metric
over the MR metric.
1) The metric can capture both the efficiency effect and
the market power effect of transmission capacity in a single
metric. This decreases the complexity of the TNSP mathe-
matical structure. The mathematical structure of the trans-
mission augmentation based on the metric has a two-
level structure, while the mathematical formulation of the
transmission augmentation based on the MR concept has a
three-level structure. This becomes a very important aspect
in developing the numerical solution.
2) Two forms of exercising market power, financial and phys-
ical withholdings, are clearly modeled on the horizontal
axis and vertical axis of the metric.
Fig. 8. Pareto front of the TNSP transmission planning schedules based on the




C. Modified IEEE 14-Bus Example System
To show the efficiency of the designed numerical solution in
Section III in solving the developed structures of (11) and (12),
the IEEE 14-bus example system is modified and employed. A
comparison between the global solution of the problem and the
best-found solution by the numerical method is carried out.
As in Section IV-B, a thorough economic study is carried
out to clearly highlight the merits of the developed mathemat-
ical structures for capturing the efficiency effect and the market
power effect of the transmission capacity.
The IEEE 14-bus example system has been modified to suit
the purpose of study. The data of the system are presented in
Tables XI–XIII. The single line diagram of the modified IEEE
14-bus example system is shown in Fig. 9.
The modified IEEE 14-bus example system has five GenCos,
G1-G5, and 11 retailers, R1-R11, as shown in Fig. 9. Twenty
transmission corridors support the electricity market trades to
happen. The transmission network augmentation data for this
study is presented in Table XIV.
As in Table XIV, the maximum number of circuits per trans-
mission corridor is three circuits and 100 MW per circuit. The
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transmission investment costs are designed to suit the purpose
of study.
Each GenCo has 15 strategies to choose from. These strate-
gies are built up by varying the offered price from marginal cost
to five times of the marginal cost and the offered quantity from
10% of capacity to the total capacity in steps of 10%.
Table XV shows the settings of the developed numerical
solution for solving the proposed mathematical structures in
(10) and (11). The approximate competitive equilibrium of
the electricity market is located at (544 MW, 70 $/MWh).
The equilibrium of the electricity market in the status quo
transmission system is at (271 MW, 36 806 $/MWh). The
GenCos reduce their capacity by 273 MW and this raises
the market price from 70 $/MWh to 36 806 $/MWh. This is
equivalent to . The best-found pareto
front of the TNSP, using the , is shown in Fig. 10. Based on
Fig. 10 and using $20 000 as the TNSP revenue cap, the vector
will be selected as the TNSP
solution.
Table XVI compares the market power metrics of financial
withholding, physical withholding, and the proposed metric
in two scenarios of the status quo transmission system and the
Fig. 9. Modified IEEE 14-bus example system.
TABLE XIV
TRANSMISSION NETWORK AUGMENTATION DATA
TABLE XV
SETTING PARAMETERS OF THE DEVELOPED NUMERICAL SOLUTION
augmented transmission system. The overall profit of GenCos is
calculated in the last row of Table XVI. As in Table XVI, the fi-
nancial withholding and the physical withholding are decreased
by 46% and 20%, respectively. This is equivalent to 46% reduc-
tion in the market power.
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Fig. 10. Best-found pareto front of the TNSP based on the proposed metric
and the transmission investment cost-modified IEEE 14-bus system.
TABLE XVI
THREE METRICS OF MARKET POWER IN TWO SCENARIOS OF THE STATUS QUO
AND AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
Fig. 11 shows offer curves of the GenCos in two scenarios
of status quo and augmented transmission systems. This figure
clearly shows the effect of the selected transmission augmenta-
tion schedule by the developed mathematical structure based on
the metric on reducing market power.
In the augmented transmission system, the GenCo 1 reduces
its offered price from 360 to 90 $/MWh with 40.2 MW as the
offered capacity in both cases of before augmentation and after
augmentation. The GenCo 2 increases the offered capacity to
the market from 84 to 96 MW and raises its offered price from
50 to 200 $/MWh. The GenCo 4 offers 21 MW at 80 $/MWh in
the status quo transmission system, and offers its true marginal
cost and capacity in the augmented transmission system. The
GenCo 5 experiences a situation similar to the GenCo 1 in the
two scenarios. Regarding the GenCo 2, the selected transmis-
sion planning schedule gives rise to its market power. Conse-
quently, it withholds more capacity from the electricity market
in the augmented transmission system than the status quo trans-
mission system. Nevertheless, the system as a whole has im-
proved significantly after augmentation.
However, Table XVII shows the best-found front of the TNSP
based on the mathematical structure in (12). This structure uses
the overall MR of the electricity market as a measure of the
market power.
Using a revenue cap of $35 000, solution 5 will be selected.
Using solution 5 of Table XVIII, the efficiency of the elec-
tricity market measured by the competitive social cost is im-
Fig. 11. Marginal cost curve (with bold lines) and the strategy curves of
GenCos (with dashed lines) before and after transmission system augmentation
by the proposed model.
TABLE XVII
DOMINANT SOLUTIONS OF THE BEST-FOUND FRONT BASED ON THE
SECOND DEVELOPED MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE OF TRANSMISSION
AUGMENTATION—OPTIMIZATION SET IN (12)
proved by 14%. Also, the market power is reduced by 33%. In
this case, the market power is measured by the MR.
These results show that both mathematical structures are suc-
cessful in modeling the market power effect of transmission ca-
pacity. Accordingly, they can use transmission capacity for re-
ducing market power in the electricity market.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposes two mathematical structures for mod-
eling market power in the mechanism of transmission system
augmentation. The structures are derived based on the concepts
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TABLE XVIII
COMPETITIVE SOCIAL COST AND THE MR IN THE STATUS QUO AND
AUGMENTED TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
of simultaneous-move and sequential-move games in applied
mathematics. A noncooperative decision system is employed to
model the interaction of the TNSP, with the GenCos and the
MMC, in the process of transmission system augmentation. The
Nash equilibrium is reformulated as an optimization problem.
The multiple Nash equilibria are tackled through the introduced
concept of worst Nash equilibrium. The quantity withheld and
MR, as two consequences of exercising the market power, are
mathematically modeled. The quantity withheld is modeled by
designing a metric termed L-Shape Area. This metric can model
both financial withholding and physical withholding. TheMR is
modeled by finding the profits of the GenCos in two scenarios of
the actual equilibrium and competitive equilibrium of the elec-
tricity market.
A numerical solution is developed to solve the mathematical
structures. The numerical solution is a standard genetic algo-
rithm, which has a nested IPGA.
The nested IPGA can effectively locate the Nash equilibria of
the simultaneous-move game among the GenCos.
Two example systems are employed and carefully modified
to clearly highlight the different perspectives of the proposed
structures. Numerical results prove that the proposed structures
are successful in modeling market power in the transmission
augmentation algorithm. Accordingly, they can be considered
as very good alternative frameworks for transmission network
service providers and policy makers for improving efficiency
and reducing market power in the electricity market.
APPENDIX A
Proof of theorem 1: Let be a strategy that belongs to a
strategy space and be the profit function of player in game
G. Also, let be the strategy of all other players of the game
G except player . The variable is
the Nash equilibrium of the game G if for every player and for
every strategy , we obtained
If we define , then
APPENDIX B
Proof of theorem 2:
Substituting (4) in or alternatively, we obtained
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